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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA  
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24  
CIA FOR WINPAC  
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA  
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP  
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP  
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP  
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR  
NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019

TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA  
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP  
MEETINGS, DECEMBER 4, 2009

REF: GENEVA 1132 (SFO-GVA-VII-092)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-099.

¶2. (U) Meeting Date: December 4, 2009  
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 13:00 P.M.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva  
  
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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¶3. (S) The Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG), chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative Col Petrov, met twice on December 4. Discussion during both sessions focused on Section VI, Inspections of Deployed Strategic Offensive Arms (SOA), Warheads, and Operational Bases (Type One inspections). Russia also provided its version of a joint draft text for Article XI.

¶4. (S) Ilin continued to claim that SLBM launchers converted to launch cruise missiles would be considered non-deployed SLBM launchers and inspectable under the Type One quota. He also argued that all heavy bombers located at an air base during a Type One inspection should be inspectable, including

those equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Ilin also questioned why the United States would not provide specific locations for all heavy bombers located outside national territory. Russia remained opposed to any special restrictions on mobile missiles.

¶ 15. (S) The working group chairs agreed to expand the temporary exemption from inspection, which was limited to heavy bomber bases under START, to all types of bases and also discussed counting rules and Russia's problems with a limit on non-deployed launchers.

¶ 16. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Agreement on the Title and Purpose for Type One Inspections; Little Progress on Key Elements for Type One Inspections; Russia Provides Insights on its Problems with Non-deployed Limits.

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AGREEMENT ON THE TITLE AND PURPOSE  
FOR TYPE ONE INSPECTIONS  
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¶ 17. (S) During the morning session, Col Ilin passed Dr. Warner the Russian-proposed joint draft text (JDT) for Article XI in Russian and promised a translation later in the afternoon. Ilin also reminded the working group that Russia had dropped its objections to providing the reasons or absent items of inspections (IOI) during the pre-inspection briefings. Warner noted that the sides still had an issue over the right to inspect within the boundaries of a site, a topic that arose during previous discussions on paragraph 6,

Section VII for Type Two inspections (Reftel).

¶ 18. (S) The sides agreed on the long title to use for Section VI, "Inspections of ICBMs and SLBMs Including the Warheads on Them, Deployed Heavy Bombers and the Nuclear Armaments on Them, and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article XI of the Treaty (Type One Inspections)," and agreed to use the short title of Type One Inspections later in the section.

¶ 19. (S) The sides also agreed that Type One inspections would entail inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs including the warheads on them, deployed heavy bombers and the nuclear armaments on them, non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. Type One inspections shall be conducted at ICBM bases, submarine bases and air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the declared data on the number and types of deployed and non-deployed SOA located at such facilities, the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs or the number of nuclear armaments on deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

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LITTLE PROGRESS ON KEY ELEMENTS  
FOR TYPE ONE INSPECTIONS  
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¶ 110. (S) No movement was made on the annual quota of Type One inspections or the number of times a facility would be inspected each year. The sides agreed not to conduct any other type of inspection activity at a single site simultaneously, and agreed to broaden the right to temporarily exempt a base from inspection to include any airbase, ICBM base or submarine base.

¶ 111. (S) Warner explained the U.S. concept for Type One inspections of airbases, which would permit direct inspection of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments located at the base as "visitors," provided they were of the same type as those assigned to that specific base. Ilin wondered why the United States would not allow inspections of all heavy bombers at a base during an inspection and argued that even heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments visiting the

base being inspected should be subject to inspection. After a long discussion about U.S. operational practices, Ilin finally agreed that the United States did not have, and would not have, non-deployed heavy bombers that could visit U.S. heavy bomber bases during a Type One inspection.

¶12. (S) During both sessions, Ilin argued that launchers converted to sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) would be considered as non-deployed SLBM launchers and subject to inspection under a Type One at a U.S. submarine base. Warner reiterated the U.S. position on SLCM launchers and asked Ilin to take a look at the U.S. draft Agreed Statement on SSGNs.

¶13. (S) Ilin questioned why the United States would not provide specific locations for all heavy bombers deployed outside its national territory, and raised a hypothetical "crazy" situation in which a heavy bomber took nuclear armaments from its home base and delivered them to a location

outside national territory. Warner reminded Ilin that the U.S. notified Russia when these heavy bombers deployed and their general location, and that neither side carried nuclear weapons during peacetime. As these bombers were conducting either conventional combat operations or normal training, there was no need to provide Russia with the specific locations of such bombers outside U.S. national territory.

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RUSSIA PROVIDES INSIGHTS ON ITS PROBLEMS  
WITH NON-DEPLOYED LAUNCHER LIMITS

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¶14. (S) Warner noted that the sides remained at odds on counting rules with the United States continuing to embrace the "considered to contain" rule with regard to ICBM and SLBM launchers while the Russian approach involved specific distinctions between "deployed" and "non-deployed" ICBM and SLBM launchers. Warner reminded Ilin that, while the United States understood the logic of the Russian counting rules, acceptance of the Russian concept was predicated on acceptance of a separate or combined limit on non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers.

¶15. (S) Ilin explained that when Russia developed its concept of deployed and non-deployed launchers it viewed the concept of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW) as a flaw as it provided the United States with significant upload potential using its stored SDVs and wareads. Russia ultimately decided that it would be more productive to limit operationally deployed SDs (ODSDVs) as a means to reduce upload potential. Russia viewed its approach limiting ODSDVs as conceptually similar to limiting ODSNW.

¶16. (S) Ilin also highlighted the two major drawbacks Russia saw with the U.S. draft treaty: 1) the United States had decided not to eliminate SDVs; and the U.S. concept of converted heavy bombers (B-1Bs) and strategic submarines (SSGNs) would result in these options being no longer subject to the provisions of the treaty, yet they could be potentially reconverted back to nuclear-capable systems.

¶17. (S) Warner indicated that Russia's concept of deployed and non-deployed systems had a solid basis but it also had one glaring shortcoming, which was directly related to upload potential, neither side would be motivated to eliminate or convert "non-deployed" ICBM and SLBM launchers or "non-deployed" heavy bombers. To meet the central limits on deployed launchers, a Party simply had to separate the ballistic missile from the launcher and place them both in storage. The United States had proposed to limit non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers to provide a stimulus to eliminate older, non-deployed systems.

¶18. (S) Ilin countered that the United States was not in the same position as Russia with regard to empty or non-deployed launchers. Ilin noted that Russia had a huge number of SSBN and ICBM launchers that were queued up awaiting elimination,

which imposed a significantly unfair financial burden on Russia. Ilin believed the United States should take on the same financial and legal obligations to eliminate U.S. launchers.

¶119. (S) Warner offered that perhaps a combined limit on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, along the lines proposed in September by the Russian side, might be workable as it would provide Russia more headroom for non-deployed launchers while providing the United States with more room for the deployed SDVs. Ilin commented that the U.S.-proposed limit of 800 deployed launchers and a separate limit of 150 non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers actually created the significant upload potential that concerned Russia. It allowed the United States to achieve its objectives while avoiding any obligation to eliminate launchers. Zaitsev added that the 150 limit was taken as primarily focused on imposing a limit on Russian mobile ICBM launchers and was therefore unacceptable.

¶120. (S) When Warner pointed out that without the 150 separate limit there would be no restrictions on the number of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers a side could possess, Ilin claimed that was why the Russians had proposed limiting SDVs. Ilin said that Russia simply did not have the funds to eliminate the large number of non-deployed launchers and missiles it would have in the coming years. Zaitsev added that the 7-year SFO reduction period was too short to accomplish the elimination of all the obsolete submarines and mobile ICBMs and their launchers, and that Russia could not possibly return them to service as they simply did not work anymore.

¶121. (U) Documents provided:

- RUSSIA:

-- Russian-Proposed Joint Draft Text for Article XI.

¶122. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner  
Mr. Brown  
Mr. Buttrick  
LTC Leyde  
Mr. McConnell  
Ms. Pura  
Ms. Purcell  
Mr. Rust  
Mr. Sims  
Mr. Smith  
Ms. Gross (Int for AM Session)  
TSgt Bennett (Int for PM Session)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin  
Mr. Izrazov  
Col Zaitsev  
Ms. Vodopolskaya  
Ms. Komshilova (Int for PM Session)  
Mr. Pogodin (Int for AM Session)

¶123. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
GRIFFITHS